Suchergebnisse

What effect do the domestic institutional constraints in target states have on sanction outcomes? Other than the narrow focus on political regime type, little is known about how the institutional makeup of target states might affect leaders' ability to adjust their policies to defy sanctions. We assert that the size of veto players in targets is a crucial yet overlooked institutional factor in explaining sanction effectiveness. We contend that political leaders subject to the approval of multiple veto players are more likely to concede as they are less likely to develop polices to counter the sanctions. We assess the empirical merits of our theoretical claims by combining data on sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set with the veto points data from the Political Constraints data set. Results from the data analysis for the 1946 to 2005 period indicate that the size of veto players is a significant predictor of sanction success even when we control for political regime type and other major political and economic covariates of sanction effectiveness.

What effect do the domestic institutional constraints in target states have on sanction outcomes? Other than the narrow focus on political regime type, little is known about how the institutional makeup of target states might affect leaders' ability to adjust their policies to defy sanctions. We assert that the size of veto players in targets is a crucial yet overlooked institutional factor in explaining sanction effectiveness. We contend that political leaders subject to the approval of multiple veto players are more likely to concede as they are less likely to develop polices to counter the sanctions. We assess the empirical merits of our theoretical claims by combining data on sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set with the veto points data from the Political Constraints data set. Results from the data analysis for the 1946 to 2005 period indicate that the size of veto players is a significant predictor of sanction success even when we control for political regime type and other major political and economic covariates of sanction effectiveness.

Recent patterns suggest that states are using economic sanctions more frequently. However, sanctions fail to achieve intended political or economic goals most of the time. To account for this anomaly, I introduce a culture-based explanation. The rationale is that sanction effectiveness cannot be solely judged by norms and standards of sender countries. Target countries' cultural norms play an important role in explaining sanction effectiveness. Using cases of US economic sanctions against China, I show that the norms and beliefs of target countries play an important role in defining sanction effectiveness. The implication of the study is that senders of economic sanctions must take cultural responses and sensitivity of targets into serious consideration in order to deploy credible and successful economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. (Asian Perspec/GIGA)

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses our work on the implementation of U.S. sanctions against Iran. It discusses the continuing challenges the United States faces in (1) deterring the illegal transshipment of U.S. goods to Iran, (2) restricting foreign investment in Iran's energy sector, and (3) assessing the overall effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. In addition, it discusses how the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (signed into law on July 1, 2010) addresses these challenges. The United States has imposed multiple sanctions against Iran to deter it from developing its nuclear program, supporting terrorism, and abusing human rights. The United States has banned most U.S. trade and investment with Iran and prohibited firms from knowingly transshipping U.S. goods to Iran through other nations. The United States has also acted to limit Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport its petroleum resources. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 expands existing sanctions against Iran and requires the Administration to report on information related to the sanctions. This testimony is drawn from prior GAO work related to sanctions against Iran. We conducted this work in accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework and generally accepting government auditing standards, as appropriate."

Post-Cold War financial sanctions utilization reached its peak as policymakers employed used them in order to face address major international crises. Their prominence among foreign policy instruments sparked the interest of many scholars and enriched the existing literature. However, their attractiveness raises several interesting research questions, such as "Do targeted sanctions suffice to achieve the defined objectives?", "Which variables affect their effectiveness?", "What shortcomings can be overcomed to make them more productive?" To probe these queries, in this paper different aspects of both comprehensive and financial/ smart/ targeted sanctions are examined. It is concluded that political will and better understanding of their effects is needed to improve sanctions design and overcome legal and administrative obstacles, since the current flaws are not incurable.

In recent years, sanctions – or restrictive measures within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – have become one of the European Union (EU)'s instruments of choice for dealing with external crises. Given EU foreign policymakers so often resort to sanctions, they should be aware of the limits, pitfalls, and benefits associated with this instrument. After all, a well-designed and well-managed sanctions policy requires a profound knowledge of the contextual conditions under which sanctions work – or fail to work. This policy-focused article, therefore, compares dominant views held by EU policy practitioners with the sanctions effectiveness literature. Building on thirty-six expert interviews conducted with members of the EU sanctions community, it examines whether there is a basis for evidence-based policy making inside the EU's sanctions machinery. The article finds that while such basis exists, there is also room for mutual learning between academic experts and EU policy practitioners.